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In United States v. Hall' the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit refused to hold that employer contributions to a pension plan
are per se discriminatory and nondeductible under section 401 (a)(4) of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 2 where the plan provides for
immediate vesting for partners and for deferred vesting for other
employees. Carefully circumscribing its holding, the court went on to
state that such a pension plan would be discriminatory if its eligibility
and vesting provisions operate to exclude from the practical benefits
of the plan so many employees "that its value to the employee group
as a whole is illusory."3 The Fargo Medical Clinic established a
money-purchase plan4 for its thirty-three physician partners. In
addition, the clinic provided the employees of the partnership with a
unit-benefit pension plan.' While the partners' plan provided for
immediate vesting, an employee's benefits did not vest until he had
completed fifteen years of service and attained age fifty. The
Commissioner disallowed a partner's claim of a deduction in the
amount of his contribution, reasoning that the two plans
discriminated against the employees since under no circumstances
would the partner lose his benefits while an employee's termination of
employment before the time of vesting would result in total forfeiture
of his benefits. Finding that the benefits under the employees' plan
were actually more favorable than those provided by the partners'
plan, the district court held for the taxpayer.' The court of appeals
reversed and remanded, instructing the trial court to hear further
evidence on whether the practical effect of the different vesting
provisions was to render the value of the plan illusory to the employee
group as a whole.
'398 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1968).
I NT. REV. CODEOF 1954, § 401(a)(4).
398 F.2d at 390.
4 A money-purchase plan normally provides for a stated employer contribution equal to a
fixed percentage of each partner's annual compensation with benefits payable upon retirement
consisting of the total contributions plus accumulated investmeht earnings. See Alexander,
Advantages and Disadvantages of Pension, Profit-Sharing Whd Stock Bonus Plans: A
Discussion, N.Y.U. 14TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 1251, 1278-79 (1956).
'Under a unit-benefit plan, employer contributions equal the market price of annuities
calculated to provide upon retirement a stated sum determined by a fixed percentage of each
employee's annual compensation for each year of past and current service. See id. at 1278.
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Employer deductions for contributions to employee trusts were
first specifically permitted by the Revenue Act of 1928' although they
had been permitted as a general business expense prior to that
enactment.8 As income tax rates became more progressive, pension
plans were increasingly used to defer income for employees whose
present income was high but whose future income could be expected to
decrease, thus reducing their total tax.9 In an effort to spread the
benefits of such plans over the entire employee group, the Revenue
Act of 1942 introduced provisions presently found in section 401 (a)(4)
which make contributions deductible only if the pension plan is
available to employees generally without discrimination in favor of
highly compensated personnel.'" Being realistic, however, the
draftsmen of the statute apparently did not intend to require exact
equality between the benefits received by highly-compensated
personnel. and other employees but, instead, provided that
contributions or benefits might vary as long as the actual operation of
the plan did not exclusively or disproportionately favor the upper-
echelon employees."
A common means of favoring highly-paid employees has been the
use of pension plans which provide shorter vesting periods for high-
level employees than for employees as a whole. Such vesting
differentials may permit a much greater proportion of highly
compensated employees to receive pension benefits since many low-
level employees will terminate their employment before the delayed
vesting of benefits occurs. Prior to 1965, the Revenue Rulings were
primarily concerned with discrimination in vesting where all
employees were covered by the same plan but the highly compensated
groups enjoyed a more favorable vesting provision than the employees
as a whole.'2 However, a 1965 ruling'3 dealt with a situation in which
6 Hall v. United States, 7 P-H 1967 FED. TAXES (19 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 798) 67-423
(D.N.D. Jan. 31, 1967).
'Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 23(q), 45 Stat. 802 (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 404).
E.g., Forbes Lithograph Mfg. Co. v. White, 42 F.2d 287 (D. Mass. 1930); Elgin Nat'l Watch
Co., 17 B.T.A. 339 (1929).
'See Gordon, Discrimination Problems in the Drafting and in the Operation of Pension and
Profit Sharing Plans, N.Y.U. 14TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 1153 (1956).
" Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 165(a)(4), 56 Stat. 862 (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 401(a)(4)).
" See S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 137 (1942).
"See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 178, 1965-2 Cum. BULL. 94, 114-15, 120; Rev. Rul. 163, 1957-1 Cum.
BULL. 128, 142, 146; Rev. Rul. 33, 1953-1CuI. BULL. 267, 280-81.
" Rev. Rul. 266, 1965-2 Cum. BULL. 138-39.
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there was a money-purchase plan with immediate vesting for the
highly compensated group and a unit-benefit plan with delayed
vesting for other employees. Since a unit-benefit plan gave definite
stated benefits upon retirement, while the benefits under a money-
purchase plan were dependent upon the amount which the
contributions earned through investment prior to retirement,'" the
Commissioner took the position that the benefits would usually be
accepted as equal even if some differences existed, provided that it
could be shown there was no discrimination in contributions.
However, since vesting determined the employees' right to receive the
plan's benefits and could be used to exclude all but a favored group
from the benefits, the Commissioner determined that any plan with
unequal vesting provisions was discriminatory under section
401 (a)(4).13
Rejecting the Commissioner's position, the Eighth Circuit
concluded in Hall that identical vesting provisions will not necessarily
accomplish the avowed objectives of section 401(a)(4), namely, the
elimination of the deferral of income for highly-paid employees and
prevention of the use of.pension plans to provide benefits only for a
favored group.' 6 Since vesting was not the sole source of
discrimination in favor of upper-echelon employees but was only one
of several areas in which discrimination could occur, the court saw no
need to single out vesting for special treatment when such treatment
was not essential to solving the discrimination problem.
Furthermore, the court was of the opinion that the requirement of
identical vesting provisions would constitute an infringement upon the
legislative prerogative. It was reasoned that if identical vesting
provisions were required, the end result would be increased use of
money-purchase plans since most employers would choose to continue
giving immediate vesting to the highly-compensated groups."
Although recent presidential studies have approved the general
principle of early vesting, they have refused to recommend that
Congress establish a minimum-vesting standard.' 9 The court therefore
See generally Alexander, supra note 4, at 1278-79.
" Rev. Rul. 266, 1965-2 Cum. BULL. 138-39.
6 398 F.2d 383, 389 (8th Cir. 1968).
17Id.
I d. at 388.
"Report to the President fron the President's Advisory Conmmittee on Labor-Manage-
mnent Policy on the Recommendations by the Cabinet Connittee on Corporate Pension
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concluded that since Congress had not acted to establish a minimum-
vesting standard, the judiciary should not intervene by forcing
business to adopt one through the requirement of identical vesting
provisions. Instead, the court restated the rule, first expounded in
1942, ' that variations in contributions or benefits are allowable as
long as the plan "viewed as a whole" does not discriminate in favor of
upper-echelon employees.2 1 Since the district court had heard no
evidence with regard to how many employees could be expected to
realize the benefits of the plan, the court reversed and remanded to
allow both parties to present additional information on the plan's
potential operation.2 2
The immediate practical effect of the court's opinion should be to
encourage pension plan growth since delayed-employee vesting may
reduce the employer's costs and make the plans more attractive to
smaller companies. First, with delayed-employee vesting, the forfeited
benefits will be used to reduce the employer's contributions to the
plan.23 Concomitantly, the employee who remains with his job could
be the one who benefits by delayed vesting if the company sets plan
benefits at a higher level in anticipation of future forfeitures being
used to reduce employer contributions. 4 Second, the Hall opinion
provides smaller companies with greater flexibility in tailoring their
plans to their own needs and capabilities instead of being told what
provisions to use by the local IRS pension trust reviewer. Many local
reviewers feel that forfeitures favor the highly compensated group
since it most likely consists of those individuals who will stay the
longest and receive the most benefits." Because the highly com-
pensated group is usually larger in proportion to other employees
in small firms than in large ones, many reviewers require small
companies to provide very quick vesting, which increases employer
costs since more employees will receive benefits, regardless of length
Funds and Other Private Retirement and Welfare Programs, printed in PRESIDENT'S
COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE PENSION FUNDS AND OTHER PRIVATE RETIREMENT AND WELFARE
PROGRAMS, PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE PENSION PROGRAMS-REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON
PRIVATE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT PLANS, app. D, at 3 (1965) (reprinted in 63 MICI. L. REV. at
1264 (1965)).
'0 See S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 137 (1942).
2, Rev. Rul. 178, 1965-2 Cum. BULL. 94, 119.
22398 F.2d 383, 391 (8th Cir. 1968).
B See Chatterton, Slow Vesting Can Cut Pension Costs But IRS Opposes It For Small Firms,
13 J. TAX. 218, 219 (1960).
24 Id.
2. Id. at 22 1.
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of service..2 6 With the Hall holding that inequalities in vesting are not
discriminatory per se,27 a small business can more readily challenge an
early-vesting provision demanded by a local reviewer. However, the
burden remains on the taxpayer to show that a substantial number of
employees will not be exluded from the plan's benefits due to
forfeitures caused by the unequal vesting provisions."0 By repeating
the "plan-as-a-whole" rule, the court has reminded the IRS not to
rely on neat formulas but to review each plan on a case-to-case basis,
with an awareness that what was discriminatory under one set of
circumstances may not be under others. Since the Internal Revenue
Service is bound only by a Supreme Court ruling,2 9 the Hall court
may have avoided considerable confusion by stating only a general
rule, thus leaving the field open for the Commissioner to establish
guidelines for a discrimination test rather than imposing a judicial
standard which the Commissioner could decide not to follow. But as
the court realized," until such guidelines are established, pension
planners, as well as IRS agents, will remain uncertain as to when and
to what degree unequal vesting provisions will be allowed.
26 See id. at 219, 221.
" 398 F.2d 383, 389-90 (8th Cir. 1968).
I8 d. at 390.
:Seegenerally5 P-H 1968 FED. TAXES 41, 351(b).
398 F.2d at 390.
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